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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
V.

:
: CASE NO. 920553-CA

DENNIS SESSIONS,
: PRIORITY NO. 2
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.
:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. Section 78-2a-2(2)(f) 1953 (as amended), in which Appellant
appeals from a judgment of conviction of two counts of forgery,
both second degree felonies, Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-501, in
the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issue presented in this appeal is:
1. WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TO
SUPPORT THE GUILTY VERDICT.
This Court reviews a trial court's verdict in a criminal case
under the clearly erroneous standart of rule 52(a), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. If the verdict is against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if the Court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made, the verdict will be set
aside. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-501 (1990)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged on May 5, 1992, with three counts of
forgery, all second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
Section 76-6-501 (1990) and one count of burglary, a third degree
felony and theft, a third degree felony. (Record [hereinafter R.]
at 1 and 9-10). On July 2, 1992, Defendant was found guilty of two
counts of forgery, both second degree felonies (R. at 25-26). On
the 21st of August, 1992, Defendant was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 0-5 years on each count at the Utah State
Prison (R. at 29). Defendant's attorney filed a Notice of Appeal on
the 25th day of August, 1992 (R. at 30)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 2, 1992, a trial was held before Judge Page. The first
witness called was Mrs. Cline. She testified that on the 24th of
April, 1992, after coming home at approximately 11:45 a.m. (R. at
49-50), she left her purse and wallet at the end of the kitchen
cupboard (R. at 52). After going into another room, she heard a
noice and came back to the kitchen and noticed that her wallet was
gone (R. at 54-55). Her checkbook was taken as well (R. at 56).
She identified States exhibit 1 and 2 as two of the checks
that had her forged signature upon them (R. at 58-60). She didn't
know Mr. Sessions until seeing him in court (R. at 58-59). Finally,
she testified that Mr. Evans had stolen some of her husbands checks
2

(R. at 68).
Norma Olsen testified that on the day in guestion she saw a
white car with three occupants drive up to the victims home. She
identified States exhibit 3 and 4 as pictures of the car (R. at
76).

She stated there were two occupants of the car in the front

seat and one in the back (R. at 76).

She could not tell if the

occupants were male or female (R. at 77). She did not see the car
leave or return (R. at 42).

Further, she did state that the person

who got out of the car and walked to the victims house was white
and had light colored, blondish hair (R. at 79).
Lloyd Kilpack, a detective with the Bountiful police
department, testified that the white car in States exhibit 3 and 4
is owned by a Mrs* Shine, a girlfriend

of Mr. Ward. Mr. Ward was

arrested in this matter (R. at 97 and 98).
After defendant's arrest, while being transported to jail,
defendant admitted to passing the two checks by using his
identification. However, he denied being involved in the burglary
(R. at 102). Further, he told officer Killpack that on the date in
guestion he had met Mr. Evans and an unknown female at a 7-Elevan
near his father's home (R. at 102). He stated it was Mr. Evans and
the female who had asked him to pass the checks because neither of
them had identification (R. at 102). He also indicated that he had
a good idea the checks were stolen (R. at 103). He also said that
Mr. Evans and the female were with him when the checks were cashed
(R.at 153).
During officer Killpacks investigation he made contact with a
3

Lee Ward. Mr. Ward informed the officer that he had driven Mr.
Evans to the victim's home, but that the defendant was not with
them (R. at 114).
Mr. Evans testified that he had taken and forged a check from
the victim1 s husband, and had previously pled quilty to that charge
and the theft of Mrs. Cline's wallet (R. at 117 and 118).
He further testified that he was with Mr. Ward and the girl
when he stole the checks from Mrs. Cline's residence (R. at 119).
The defendant was not with Mr. Evans when he (Mr. Evans) stole
the wallet, but Mr. Evans did meet the defendant at the Regal Inn
at approximately 5:00 p.m. on the date in question

(R. at 119 and

120). Mr. Evans further testified that he did not give checks to
the defendant, and to his knowledge, no one else did (R. at 120).
He did not go to the bank with the defendant (R. at 121).
Mr. Evans admitted to previously lying about defendant's
involvment in stealing the checks (R. at 121).
Mr. Evans has blondish, light hair (R.at 124) and was in the
back seat of the car (R. at 125). The other two people in the car
stayed in it when he went into the victim's home and stole the
wallet (R. at 125). Mr. Evans took money from the wallet and then
left the wallet in the car. He didn't know what else was in the
wallet (R. at 130).
Finally, the defendant testified that on April 24, 1992, he
went to a 7-Elevan and bought beer and cigaretts. It was then that
he happened to meet Mr. Evans and his girlfriend (R. at 136).
The girlfriend was introduced to him as Kathi (R. at 136).
4

Mr. Sessions knew Mr. Ward and his family (R. at 136) and Mr.
Evans asked the defendant if he wanted a ride home (R. at 137).
Defendant got in the car and continued to drink beer and did some
drugs (R. at 137).
They drove to a park and that was when Mr. Evans and the girl
asked the defendant to cash a check for them, as the girl had just
left her husband and neither of them had identification. Defendant
asked the girl why she did not have identification and he was told
that she had got in a fight with her husband and the only thing she
had left with was the checkbook in the glove box (R. at 137 and
138).
Mr. Evans was dropped off at the Regal Inn (R. at 146) and the
girl and defendant went and cashed the first check. Defendant used
his license to cash the check (R. at 139).
The girl asked defendant if he wanted to cash more checks and
they drove to another bank and cashed another check (R. at 139).
Afterwards they stopped and bought beer and gas and then went to a
third bank. This bank kept defendant's license and the check (R. at
140).
It was at time that defendant asked the girl what was going
on. She repeated the same story about leaving her husband.
At this point defendant did not believe her (R. at 140).
Defendant admitted to officer Killpack that he had cashed the
checks and stated that after the bank took his license he had a
good suspicion the checks were stolen (R. at 141).
Defendant testified that at the time he cashed the checks he
5

did not know the checks were stolen, and that his hair is dark
brown (R. at 142).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court errored in finding defendant guilty of
forging two checks as the defendant's explanation of the events is
the most reasonable version and therefore, the verdict was againsst
the clear weight of evidence, or this Court could reach a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake was made.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS
EXPLANATION
AGAINST THE
COURT COULD
MISTAKE WAS

EXPLANATION OF THE EVENTS IS THE MOST REASONABLE
OF WHAT HAPPENED, AND THEREFORE, THE VERDICT WAS
CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE OR IS SUCH THAT THIS
REACH A DEFINITE AND FIRM CONVICTION THAT A
MADE.

Mr. Evans pled quilty to the burglary of the victim1s
residence and to stealing checks from the victim's husband, and
stated that the defendant was not with him when the burglary took
place (R. at 117-118). The eyewitness, Norma Olsen, testified that
the person she saw go into the victim's home had light colored,
blondish hair (R. at 79). Mr. Evans has blondish hair, while the
defendant has dark brown hair (R. at 124 and 142).
From this testimony it is apparrent that the defendant was was
not involved with the theft of the wallet and accompanying checks.
This was the testimony of the defendant as well (R. at 102 ).
The question then arises, how did the defendant get the
checks. The testimony of Mr. Evens goes to this point. He testified
that after taking the wallet he took out the money and left the
6

wallet in the car (R. at 130). This happened before the defendant
got in the car, as Mr. Evans testified that the only time he saw
the defendant was about 5:00 p.m. when he met the defendant at the
Regal Inn on the day in question (R. at 119-120).
Defendant did state he went to the Regal Inn to drop of Mr.
Ward (R. at 146), however, it was before the checks were cashed,
and therefore had to be before 5:00 because the first check was
cashed at approximately 4:49 p.m. (R. at 86).
As stated, Mr. Evans testimony corroborates the defendant's
testimony regarding the following: the defendant was not present
when the checks were stolen, the defendant did go to the Regal Inn
the aftenoon the checks were stolen, and Mr. Evans did not give the
checks to the defendant.
Also, officer Killpack testified that Mr. Ward had told him
the he (Mr. Ward) had driven Mr. Evans to the victim's home and the
defendant was not with them (R. at 114).
The defendant admited passing the two checks. However, the
state must prove that he did so, "...with a purpose to defraud or
he did so with knowledge he was facilitating a fraud to be
perpetrated by anyone..." (R. at 10).
Defendant's explanation that he met Mr. Evans at a 7-Eleven
and was asked to help cash a check is the most reasonable
explanation of what took place. The is especially true in light of
Mr. Evans testimony and the statements of Mr. Ward enumerated
above. The trial Court found their testimony credible, as the court
found the defendant not guilty of the burglary and related theft
7

charge (R. at 26).
Defendant further testified that he asked the female on two
occassions about her having the checks and why she did not have
identification (R. at 137-138 and 140). It was only after the bank
kept defendant's license and the check they were attempting to cash
that defedant did not believe her story (R. at 140). At this point,
however, the two checks which defendant is charged with had already
been cashed. As noted, however, the two checks were cashed prior
to his forming the belief that the girl was not telling him the
truth regarding her not having identification. As such, at the time
the two checks were cashed he was under the belief, although
mistaken, that she was the owner of the checks.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above discussion, the Appellant respectfully asks
this Court to overturn the trial courts judgment of conviction.
Respectfully submitted this 21t}i day of December, 1992.
$

William J. Albright
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I have thoroughly reviewed the file and
have read the transcripts and that I have raised the points/issues
requested by the Appellant in this brief and that on the 21st day
of December, 1992, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the above brief and a copy of the transcript to Dennis
Sessions at the following address: Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250,
Draper, Utah 84020
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ADDENDUM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICBtD \H C\?Rr<' OFr
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH . _,

WC 2*1 li 13 #,"
vi en,

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AMENDED
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON

DENNIS SESSIONS
Case No. 92170 0250

Defendant.

That whereas said defendant, having been convicted or
plead guilty to the crime(s) of two counts of Forgery, felonies of
the third degree, and now being present in Court accompanied by
his attorney and ready for sentence, thereupon the Court renders
its judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
The defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison
for an indeterminate term of 0-5 years on each count.
Court recommendations: To run concurrently. Court
recommends a substance abuse program.
Dated this 21st day of August, 1992, with the Seal of
the Court affixed hereto.

BY THE COURT:

District court Judge
PAULA CARR
Clerk of Court

/

/

Bv / , ,^^y^
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CRIMINAL CODE

109

nvestigation, disconnection, reconnection, service
lis employee time, and equipment use.
,6) Criminal prosecution u n d e r this section does
affect the right of a utility or cable television
moany to bring a civil action for redress for damsuffered as a result of t h e commission of any of
fkTacts prohibited by this section.
,7) This section does not abridge or alter any other
rfht action, or remedy otherwise available to a utilrtv or cable television company.
1990
T6-6-410- T h e f t b y p e r s o n h a v i n g c u s t o d y

of

property p u r s u a n t to r e p a i r or rental
agreement
A person is guilty of theft if:
(1) Having custody of property pursuant to an
agreement between himself or another and the
owner thereof whereby the actor or another is to
perform for compensation a specific service for
the owner involving the maintenance, repair, or
use of such property, he intentionally uses or operates it, without the consent of the owner, for
his own purposes in a manner constituting a
gross deviation from the agreed purpose; or
(2) Having custody of a n y property p u r s u a n t
to a rental or lease a g r e e m e n t where it is to be
returned in a specified m a n n e r or a t a specified
time, intentionally fails to comply with t h e t e r m s
of the agreement concerning r e t u r n so as to render such failure a gross deviation from t h e agreement.
1973
?*^-411.

Repealed.

1974

76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses —
Action for treble d a m a g e s against receiver of stolen p r o p e r t y .
11) Theft of property and services as provided in
tfus chapter shall be punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon
at the time of the theft; or
(\\T\

rvrrn-uar+v

cfnl<

th a norcnn nf

76-6-504
PART 5
FRAUD

76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined.
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to
defraud anyone, or with knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) alters any writing of another without his
authority or utters any such altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates,
issues, transfers, publishes, or utters any writing
so that the writing or the making, completion,
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the
act of another, whether the person is existent or
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at
a time or place or in a numbered sequence other
than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an
original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing" includes printing or any other method of recording information,
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value,
right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the
writing is or purports to be:
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a government, or
any agency thereof; or
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or
more, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in
or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest
in or claim against any person or enterprise.
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if t h e
writing is or purports to be a check with a face
a m o u n t of less t h a n $100; all other forgery is a class
A misdemeanor.
1975

76-6-502. Possession of forged writing or device
for writing.
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowingly
possesses any writing that is a forgery as defined in
Section 76-6-501, or who with intent to defraud knowingly possesses any device for making any such writing, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, except
where the altering, making, completion, execution,
issuance, transfer, publication, or utterance of such

CERTIFICATE OF DELIEVERY
I, William J. Albright, hereby certify that I hand delivered
two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
Dennis Sessions to the following:
Criminal Appeals Division
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Dated this 21st day of December, 1992.
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